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Abstract— A new high-level implementation independent 
functional fault model for control faults in microprocessors is 
introduced. The fault model is based on the instruction set, and 
is specified as a set of data constraints to be satisfied by test data 
generation. We show that the high-level test, which satisfies 
these data constraints, will be sufficient to guarantee the 
detection of all non-redundant low level faults. The paper 
proposes a simple and fast simulation based method of 
generating test data, which satisfy the constraints prescribed by 
the proposed fault model, and a method of evaluating the high-
level control fault coverage for the proposed fault model and for 
the given test. A method is presented for identification of the 
high-level redundant faults, and it is shown that a test, which 
provides 100% coverage of non-redundant high-level faults, will 
also guarantee 100% non-redundant SAF coverage, whereas all 
gate-level SAF not covered by the test are identified as 
redundant. Experimental results of test generation for the 
execution part of a microprocessor support the results presented 
in the paper.  
Keywords: processor core testing, high-level control fault model, 
high-level fault simulation, fault coverage, fault redundancy 
  
I. INTRODUCTION 
Technology scaling in today’s deep-submicron processes 
produce new failure mechanisms in electronic devices, which 
has forced researchers to develop more advanced fault 
models compared to the traditional stuck-at fault (SAF) 
model [1], and to investigate the possibilities of reasoning the 
faulty behavior of systems without using any particular fault 
models [2, 3].    
Fault models for digital circuits have been developed for 
different types of failure mechanisms like signal line bridges 
[4], transistor stuck-opens [5] or failures due to increasing 
circuit delays [6]. Another trend has emerged to develop 
general fault modeling mechanisms and corresponding test 
tools that can effectively analyze arbitrary fault types. The 
oldest example is the D-calculus [7]. A generalization of this 
approach has been found in the input pattern fault model [8], 
and in the pattern fault model [9], which can represent any 
arbitrary change in the logic function of a circuit block, where 
a block is defined to be any combinational sub-circuit 
described at any level of the design hierarchy.  
A similar pattern related fault modeling approach called 
functional fault model was proposed earlier in [10] for the 
module level fault diagnosis in combinational circuits. The 
functional (or pattern) fault model allows an arbitrary set of 
signal lines to be grouped into activation conditions for a 
single fault site, allowing a variety of physical defect types to 
be modeled. Based on the functional fault model a 
deterministic defect-oriented test pattern generator DOT was 
developed in [11] which allowed proof of the logic 
redundancy of not detected physical defects. 
In [12], a similar model called conditional faults was 
proposed for test generation purposes, and in [13] for 
diagnosis purposes. A conditional fault allows additional 
signal line objectives to be combined with the detection 
requirements of a particular fault. For complete exercising 
blocks in combinational circuits on the gate level, a similar 
pattern oriented gate-exhaustive fault model was proposed in 
[14], which was extended to target bigger regions (collections 
of gates) by region-exhaustive fault model in [15]. 
The described functional, conditional and pattern fault 
models offer high flexibility in defect modeling beyond 
single SAF model. Further advancements of the low-level 
fault modeling have been achieved by introducing the fault 
tuple fault model [16], realistic sequential cell fault model 
[17], or cell-internal defect model [18], where the last two 
cases provide general capability to handle sequential 
misbehavior of circuits. 
The conditional SAF model (and other listed models) [8-
18] support hierarchical test approach, where the test pattern 
(or sequence), which activates a low-level fault (e.g. physical 
defect) at the lower level can be considered as the high-level 
condition (or constraint) for the functional fault defined at the 
higher level. 
To increase the speed of test generation and fault 
coverage evaluation, high-level (functional or behavioral) 
fault models have been developed. Such a model can be 
considered as “good”, if the tests generated using this model 
provide a high coverage of SAF or physical defects.  
In the design hierarchy, higher-level descriptions have 
fewer implementation details, but more explicit functional 
information than lower level descriptions. High-level fault 
models depend on which level the tests are generated. 
  
 
Usually, the methods of high-level test generation are divided 
into structural RTL based methods [19-20], or behavioral test 
generation methods [21-22]. A high-level fault model can be 
explicit or implicit [23-24]. An explicit model identifies each 
fault individually, and every fault in this model will be a 
target for test generation. Implicit models are based on the 
assumption that all gate-level faults may not be represented 
at the RT level, and this motivated to develop dedicated RTL 
fault models with dependence on implementation details.  
High-level fault models are used widely in the field of 
Software-Based Self-Test [25-30]. These approaches can be 
divided into two major groups - structural and functional. 
Structural approaches, such as [25-26], are based on test 
generation using information from lower level of design 
(gate- or RTL-level description) of processor under test. 
Functional, in its turn, is using instruction set architecture 
(ISA) information of the processor under test [27-30].   
The main and general problem of high-level faults is the 
difficulty of proving that the model covers all low-level 
detectable (non-redundant) faults. In existence of such a high-
level proof, it would be possible to identify the redundancy 
of gate-level faults exclusively by only gate-level fault 
simulation, which has cheaper cost than low-level fault 
redundancy proof by conventional gate-level ATPG-s. 
In this paper, we make such attempt for a restricted class 
of circuits with well-defined functionality. Particularly, we 
target ALU control circuits. We propose a high-level data 
constraint based functional control fault model, and we prove 
that the test producing 100% high-level fault coverage will 
also guarantee 100% low-level detectable SAF coverage, and 
that all not detected SAF, identified by low-level fault 
simulation, are redundant. 
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. In section 2, 
we present a novel control fault model for microprocessors, 
and in Section 3 we investigate the problem of mapping these 
high-level faults to low-level. Section 4 discusses high-level 
fault coverage measurement. In Section 5, we investigate the 
problem of high-level fault redundancies, and in Section 6 
low-level fault redundancies. Section 7 presents experimental 
data, and Section 8 concludes the paper. 
II. HIGH-LEVEL CONTROL FAULT MODEL FOR PROCESSORS 
In this paper, we focus on testing of the ALU control, as a part 
of all control circuits in microprocessor cores.  
Assume, the ALU executes n different functions y = fi (Di) 
by a set F = {fi } of instructions, where Di is the set of data 
operands for fi , the length of the data word is m, and ALU is 
controlled by p control signals. Consider a general ALU model 
partitioned into the control and data parts as shown in Fig.1. 
The control part consists of the multiplexer MUX and p control 
lines as control inputs to MUX. The n AND blocks in MUX 
have each p control and a single m-bit data input, whereas the 
OR block in MUX has n data word inputs from the outputs of 
AND blocks. Each AND block consists of m AND gates with 
p control inputs, and a single bit data input. 
Let us classify two types of high-level functional fault 
models for ALU: control faults (the faults related to the 
control part of ALU), and data faults (the faults related to the 
data part of ALU). In the following, we will consider the 
control fault testing.  
Definition 2. Introduce for the function (instruction) fi ∈ 
F, the following high-level control fault model CFM(fi) = 
{Ex(fi), C(yi, F)}, where C(yi, F) is a set of the constraints to 
be satisfied for each bit k of yi: 
                             ∀k: (yi/k ≠ 0),                                   (1)  
                         ∀fj∈F, j ≠i : {∀k: (yi/k < yj/k)}                    (2) 
Depending on the technology, implemented in the  
microprocessor, the constant 0 in formula (1) can be changed 
into 1, and instead of the relation “ < ” in formula (2), there 
can be “ > “. 
Definition 1. Let us introduce control fault universe as a 
set of any multiple SAF and bridging faults on the control lines 
of the control part (shown as control fault locations in Fig.1). 
Introduce the following notations: Ex(fi) – execution of the 
instruction fi,  yi – the data word considered as the result of the 
introduction fi at the data operands Di. 
 
Fig.1. Generic DNF based control structure of ALU 
The proposed fault model can be regarded as a 
generalization of the conditional SAF model (or similar ones 
considered in  [8-18]). In case of conditional SAF, we are 
testing SAF on the gate-level lines at some constrained 
signals on other lines, whereas in case of the high-level fault 
model of Definition 2, we are testing the instructions of 
microprocessors at a set of constraints for data (operands). 
Let us compare the complexities of the proposed high-
level control fault model and the traditional SAF model of the 
control part architecture in Fig.1. The complexity of SAF 
model can be represented by the size of the model, i.e. by the 
number of control lines in the circuit multiplied by two for 
both SAF types: C(SAF) = 2nmp. On the other hand, the 
complexity of the proposed high-level control fault model 
(CFM) can be represented by the number of data constraints 
to be satisfied, that is C(CFM) = n(n-1)mp. 
  
 
The time costs TC of test generation for both cases of the 
fault model can be estimated roughly by multiplying the size 
of the model with average test generation time t per fault as  
                              TC(SAF) = 2nmp * tSAF                        (3) 
                         TC(CFM) = n(n-1)mp * tFFM                                 (4) 
Despite that the size C(SAF) is linear with the circuit size, the 
gate-level test generation time with ATPGs is not scalable. 
On the other hand, despite  the quadratric size of the high-
level control fault model C(CFM), the test generation time for 
solving the data constraints (2) is linear, and very efficiently 
executable by random search (see experimental data).  
Note, to simplify the model proposed in Definition 2 with 
the goal to reduce its size, the set of instructions F can be 
partitioned into subsets of F, similarly as proposed in [29], 
and for each subset, dedicated high-level fault model 
according to Definition 2 can be derived.  
The practical reason for such partitioning of F may result 
from the instruction coding scheme. For example, if different 
fields of the instruction format have separate decoding 
circuit, then for each field, a separate set of instructions F for 
the proposed in Definition 2 fault model can be assigned. 
III. HIGH-LEVEL CONTROL FAULT MAPPING TO                     
GATE-LEVEL FAULTS  
Let us consider in the following, how the gate-level fault 
redundancies in the control part of ALU can be identified by 
mixed level fault reasoning. To reduce the complexity of the 
problem, we propose, instead of exploiting slow conventional 
gate-level ATPGs for SAF redundancy proof, to use the 
combination of faster high-level test generation, and faster 
than ATPG low level fault simulation to achieve the same 
result – identification of the redundant low-level faults.   
Introduce the following notations of the input information 
for solving the problem. 
Definition 3. The set CFM = {CFM(fi)} for all fi ∈ F 
represents the full high-level control fault model for the given 
set of functions F = {fi} of the microprocessor.  
Definition 4. Let D*i – be the set of data operands which 
satisfy the constraints of the fault model CFM(fi}, T*i – the 
test, which uses the data operands D*i, and T* = {T*i} – the 
full test, generated for the control fault model CFM.   
Theorem 1. The test T* ={T*i}, which covers all non- 
redundant high-level faults of the model CFM = {CFM(fi)}, 
covers also all gate-level testable SAF in the control part of 
the microprocessor, which controls the set of functions F.  
Proof. Consider the generic ALU control part presented 
in Fig.1 and described as the following DNF: 
ݕ = ܿଵ,ଵܿଵ,ଶ…ܿଵ,௣ݕଵܿଶ,ଵܿଶ,ଶ…ܿଶ,௣ݕଶ…ܿ௡,ଵܿ௡,ଶ…ܿ௡,௣ݕ௡   (5) 
In this DNF the variables ܿ௜,௝	for selecting the data results  ݕ௜,
݅ = 1, …݊, represent the global control signals ௝ܿ, j = 1,...p, 
being either inverted or not, and covering in general case 
exhaustively all the 2p combinations. In DNF, according to 
Definition 4, and due to satisfied constraints (2) of the fault 
model in Definition 2, at least once the value of ݕ௜	for each 
݅ = 1, …݊ , will be ݕ௜  = 1. On the other hand, due to the 
exhaustiveness of all 2p combinations of control signals, for 
each term of DNF with ݕ௜ = 1, there will be a combination 
of control signals ܿ௜,ଵܿ௜,ଶ…ܿ௜,௣ consisting of a single 0, e.g. 
ܿ௜,௣ = 0 , with all others control signals ܿ௜,௥ = 1, r ≠ p. This 
is the case, where in the term ܿ௜,ଵܿ௜,ଶ…ܿ௜,௣ݕ௜ , the SAF ܿ௜,௣	1 
is activated. For propagating the fault ܿ௜,௣	1 to the output y, 
all other terms in DNF must have at least one 0 assigned to 
the variables of the term. This is guaranteed, because due to 
the constraints (2), which demands that in the term where all 
௝ܿ,௞ = 1, the value of ݕ௝ must be 0, and in other terms there 
must be at least one variable assigned by 0. Hence, all SAF 
faults of type ܿ௜,௣	1 in all variables ܿ௜,௣ can be tested by T*.  
The faults ܿ௜,௣	0 will be tested by patterns in T* where 
the constraint (1) is satisfied. ■ 
Corollary 1. Any gate-level SAF in the control part 
related to F = {fi}, not detectable by the test T* = {T*i} which 
covers all not redundant high-level control faults of the model 
CFM = {CFM(fi)}, is redundant.   
Proof. In Theorem 1, exhaustiveness of using all the 
combinations of the local control signals ܿ௜,ଵܿ௜,ଶ…ܿ௜,௣  was 
assumed. If not all  combinations are used in the instruction 
set of the microprocessor, which is the typical practical case, 
then, not all patterns can be generated for activating all SAF 
of type ܿ௜,௣	1. Usually these cases are used for optimization 
of the gate-level structure of the control part of ALU. If 
however the optimization process has not removed all 
hardware redundancy, then as the result, the control part may 
consequently contain also redundant faults. These redundant 
faults can be identified by simple and fast gate-level fault 
simulation of the high-level generated test T*. ■ 
Example 1. Consider a simplified ALU unit with the set 
of three functions f1, f2, f3, activated by a set of control signals 
ܿଶഥ ܿଵ, ܿଶܿଵഥ , ܿଶܿଵ respectively. The ALU can be represented by 
the DNF: 
ݕ = 	ܿଶഥ ܿଵݕଵܿଶܿଵഥݕଶܿଶܿଵݕଷ. 
The test T* = {T*1, T*2, T*3}generated for the control part of 
ALU that satisfies the constraints (2) is depicted in Table 1. 
Table 1. Example of a high-level control test 
T*i 
Test Fault table Constraints satisfied c2  c1  y1   y2   y3 ܿଶഥ ܿଵ ݕଵ ܿଶ	ܿଵഥ 	ݕଶ ܿଶ	ܿଵ	ݕଷ
1 2 3 4 5 6
T*1 0   1    0    1   1 1   1   0 0   0   1 0   1   1 y1 < y2, y1 < y3
T*2 1   0    1    0   1 0   0   1 1   1   0 1   0   1 y2 < y1, y2 < y3
T*3 1  1    1    1   0 0   1   1 1   0   1 1   1   0 y3 < y1, y3 < y2
The table contains the test patterns in column 2, the fault table 
in columns 3-5, and the constraints satisfied by generating 
data for the control test patterns in column 6. The detected 
gate-level faults in the fault table are highlighted by red 
colour: 0 means the value of a signal which activates the fault 
SAF/1. For example, in case of the fault c2 ≡ 1 in column 5, 
the value of the output signal y = y1 = 0 will change from 0 to 
y = y1 ∨ y3 = 1. For detecting the faults SAF/0, more 3 test 
patterns are needed (not shown in the table). We see in the 
fault table that the faults c1 ≡ 1 in column 3 and c2 ≡ 1 in 
column 4 are not detected, because of the control code  c2c1 
= 00 is illegal (not usable in this ALU). According to 
  
 
Corollary 1, these gate-level faults are redundant (in case if 
the control circuit is implemented as DNF). As the example 
shows, the redundancy of the gate-level faults can be derived 
by simple low-level SAF simulation. ■ 
 Note, Theorem 1 and Corollary 1 were formulated and 
the proofs were given, considering so far only the single SAF 
model. In fact, the power of the proposed high-level control 
fault model stretches far beyond the fault class of single SAF, 
as it will be shown in the following corollaries. 
Corollary 2. The test T* ={T*i}, covers all gate-level 
multiple SAF  and bridging faults between control lines in the 
control part of the microprocessor, which controls the set of 
functions F = {fi}. 
Proof. From (2) it follows that for each function F = {fi}, 
∀k: (yi/k < yj/k) for all j ≠ i must hold. This means that not only 
SAF/1 in a single control signal of a single function fj ∈F, j≠ 
i, can be detected (by overwriting yi/k = 0 with yj/k = 1), where 
the control words for fi and fj differ in a single bit, rather such 
overwriting of signals yi/k = 0 with 1 can happen, and hence, 
can be detected, due to multiple changes 0→1 for fj∈F, j≠i, 
leading to detecting multiple faults. This explanation can be 
derived also from reasoning of DNF (5).  
On the other hand, from the constraints (1-2), and from 
the exhaustiveness of testing all the control functions 
function fj ∈F, j≠i, it follows that non-redundant bridging 
faults between the control lines can also be detected by T*. ■      
In case, when the target would be to detect only single 
SAF, then the fault model defined by the constraints (1) and 
(2) is over-dimensioned. For the case of full single SAF 
coverage, it would be sufficient to loosen the constraint (2) to 
              ∀fj∈F, j ≠i, (HD(fj,fi) =1) : {∀k: (yi/k < yj/k)}        (6) 
where HD(fj,fi) =1 is the constraint that the Hamming distance 
between the control codes for fj and fi  is 1. This simplication 
is similar to the approach used in [29] 
Corollary 3. The size of the proposed high-level control 
fault model applied only to the code-neighboring functions 
fj,fi with HD(fj,fi) =1, is equal to C(CFM, HD=1) = nmp. 
Proof. The proof is straightforward, since for each fj∈F, 
instead of m(n-1), only mp comparisons are needed. ■   
The size of the updated with (6) high-level control model 
is 2 times smaller than for the SAF model C(SAF). Regarding 
the test cost, since tCFM  << tSAF , we get 
   TC(CFM) = nmp tCFM    <<  TC(SAF) = 2nmp tSAF.  (7)                      
IV. HIGH-LEVEL FAULT COVERAGE MEASUREMENT 
From above, it follows that the high-level control fault model 
CFM defined by the set of constraints (2) can be interpreted 
as the definition of the universe of high-level control faults. 
A direct impact of this interpretation is the possibility of 
evaluating the high-level fault coverage as the percentage of 
satisfied constraints (2) by the given test. The measuring of 
the coverage of constraints (1) is not needed, because they 
will be satisfied anyway as the byproduct of the data path test. 
The size of the proposed high-level functional fault model 
results from the fault table for representing the coverage of 
satisfied constraints (2).  
Let us introduce the high-level fault table as a matrix D = 
| | Di,j | |  with n columns and n rows, where n – is the number 
of functions in F. Each entry Di,j in D is a m-bit vector Di,j = 
(Di,j/1, Di,j/2, … , Di,j/m,), where  m is the number of bits in the 
data-word. Di,j/k = 1, if the constraint yi/k < yj/k for the bit k is 
satisfied, and Di,j/k = 0 if not. 
 
Fig.2. Architecture of the test program 
Consider a simplified architecture of a test program for 
testing the control part of ALU as shown in Fig.2. The test 
T*={T*1,…,T*n} for ALU with n functions of the set  F = {f1, 
…, fn} consists of a core of the test program, array of test 
patterns (instructions) and array of test data operands. The 
core consists of a small set of test templates for initializing 
registers, executing test patterns and processing test results. 
The test patterns are instructions, and to each instruction, a 
set of data operands is assigned, to be exercised cyclically. 
Each test pattern with related operands forms a test T*i ∈ T*. 
The task of the core is execution of the full test T*. 
For high-level fault simulation, there is no need to 
simulate the full test program illustrated in Fig.2. Instead of 
that, only the array of data operands should be processed 
according to the following procedure.  
Procedure 1. 
1) for i = 1,…,n 
2) for all data operands di,j,1, di,j,2, j = 1,…,ni 
3)       for all instructions fh, h = 1,…,n 
4)               calculate the value yh 
5)             check the relation  yi < yh, h ≠ i 
5)              update the vector Di,h ∈D  
6) end for 
For high-level test generation we developed a simulation 
based random search for test data to satisfy the constraints 
(2), where for constraint checking we used Procedure 1.  
V. IDENTIFICATION OF HIGH-LEVEL CONTROL FAULT 
REDUNDANCIES 
Consider Table 2, which illustrates a fragment of the high-
level fault coverage matrix D, for a test T* generated for the 
MiniMIPS processor [24]. In this fragment 8-bit data-words, 
and 5 functions OUI, ADD, SUB, SLT, AND of the 
MiniMIPS microprocessor are considered. 
In Table 2, the 0s refer to the possible high-level 
redundancies of the control faults related to the constraints 
yi/k < yj/k, where i and j correspond to the rows and columns, 
respectively. All 0s in Dij refer to the high probability of 
  
 
redundancy of the full set of high-level faults for all bits, 
which means that the constraints yi/k < yj/k, for all k cannot be 
satisfied. In most cases of ALU operations, it is very easy to 
identify this type of redundancy. For example, if yi = fi (a, b) 
refers to AND operation and yj = fj (a, b) refers to OR, it is 
straightforward that the constraint yi < yj, i.e. (a ∨ b) < (a ∧ b) 
cannot be satisfied. 
Table 2. Example of a High-Level Fault Table 
 f1 (OUI) f2 (ADD) f3 (SUB) f4 (SLT) f5 (AND) 
f1 (OUI)  111111 111111 111111 000000 
f2 (ADD) 11111  111110 111111 111111 
f3 (SUB) 11111 111110  111111 111111 
f4 (SLT) 11111 111111 111111  000000 
f5 (AND) 11111 111111 111111 111111  
In Table 2, the 0s refer to the possible high-level 
redundancies of the control faults related to the constraints 
yi/k < yj/k, where i and j correspond to the rows and columns, 
respectively. All 0s in Dij refer to the high probability of 
redundancy of the full set of high-level faults for all bits, 
which means that the constraints yi/k < yj/k, for all k cannot be 
satisfied. In most cases of ALU operations, it is very easy to 
identify this type of redundancy. For example, if yi = fi (a, b) 
refers to AND operation and yj = fj (a, b) refers to OR, it is 
straightforward that the constraint yi < yj, i.e. (a ∨ b) < (a ∧ b) 
cannot be satisfied.  
In cases when there is an entry Di,j/k = 1 in a single bit k of 
the vector Dij, or in only few bits of it, we can suggest for the 
proof a method called "partial truth table method”. The idea 
of the method stands in showing the equivalence of partial 
truth tables (or to prove the impossibility of solving the 
related constraints) for the functions involved in the 
constraint relation, so that as few as possible responsible bits 
should be selected for the need of the proof.  
In Table 3, examples are shown for 1-bit partial truth 
tables for the functions SUB, ADD, OR, AND, for bit k. The 
pairs 00, 01, 10, 11 represent the values of the data variables 
(as arguments) in bit k, and the 1-bit values in the columns 
show the results of the related operations for this k-th bit. For 
SUB and ADD, the equivalence of the behavior in the given 
bit is demonstrated, which contradicts to the constraint (2), 
and in the case of OR and AND, the missing of a solution for 
(2) is also shown for all possible input data combinations. 
It is easy also to show for example, the equivalence of 
operations ASR and SHR for MiniMIPS for all bits, except 
the most significant bit MSB. Hence, for all bits except for 
MSB, the entry di,j/k = 0 refers to the redundant control fault. 
In some cases, the partial truth table method will not 
work, because the results of operations may substantially 
depend on all bits of the word like for increment or decrement 
operations. When this happens, specific corner cases should 
be found for the proof of redundancy. For example, to prove 
the equivalence of increment and decrement operations in the 
least significant bit, the operand 1…110 should be used, 
where both instructions INC and DEC produce the same 
result “all 1s”. 
 
Table 3. Examples of redundancy proofs with 1-bit truth tables 
# yi/k < yj/k Dij yi/k < yj/k 00 01 10 11 
1 SUB < ADD 1…110 SUB 0 1 1 0ADD 0 1 1 0
2 OR < ADD 1…110 OR 0 1 1 1ADD 0 0 0 0
VI. MIXED-LEVEL IDENTIFICATION OF FAULT 
REDUNDANCIES 
Let us now draft the general procedure of the mixed-level 
identification of gate-level single SAF, where the test is 
generated at the high-level using the proposed high-level 
control fault model, and the redundancy of the low-level SAF 
is identified by low-level fault simulation of the test, 
generated at the high-level. 
Procedure 2. 
1) Generation of the high-level test T* for the given set of 
functions (instructions), with finding the data which satisfy 
the constraints (2) (see Section II). 
2) Generation of the high-level fault coverage table D by 
high-level fault simulation of the test T* (see Section IV). The 
steps 1 and 2 can be carried out jointly (see Section IV). 
3) High-level fault redundancy identification. For all not 
covered high-level faults (all 0s in the fault table D), the 
redundancy of the high-level control faults is identified (see 
Section V).  
4) If the high-level redundancy cannot be proven for some 
of high-level fault 
s, the test T* must be extended to satisfy the constraints 
(2), and to achieve 100% high-level fault coverage. This is 
the prerequisite (Theorem 1) for the next step of redundant 
SAF identification.   
5) Gate-level fault simulation of the test T*. The not 
detected SAF are identified as redundant low level faults in 
the control circuit of ALU (Corollary 1). 
VII. EXPERIMENTAL RESULTS 
We carried out experiments which consists of high-level test 
data generation for the control part of Execute stage of 
MiniMIPS processor [31], Fig.3. The test program generation 
included manual synthesis of test templates, high-level 
generation of test data (operands) to satisfy constraints (1-2), 
test program synthesis and high-level fault simulation. For 
high-level test generation and fault simulation we used home-
made tools, whereas for gate-level operations we used 
commercial tool. Experimental results are shown in Table 4. 
 
Fig.3. Simplified structure of the Execute stage of MiniMIPS 
 
 
  
 
Table 4. Experimental data 
Approach Experiments Faults FC% # Pat ATPG time  
Proposed 
high-level 
approach 
High-level ATPG 756 100 
196 47 s Gate-level 
simulation 
ALU 2516 99.92 
MULT 91810 99.09 
Commercial  
gate-level ATPG 
ALU 2516 99.96 
169 1h 34 min 
MULT 91810 98.63 
The experiments targeted ALU and MULT modules in the 
Execute stage of MiniMIPS. We generated a test with 100% 
coverage of high-level control faults. The operands generated 
according to (1-2), produced high gate-level SAF coverage 
for both, control and data parts of the Execute module.  
The high-level test was simulated by commercial tool to 
grade the gate-level SAF coverage. To evaluate the efficiency 
of the high-level ATPG, we used for comparison also 
commercial gate-level ATPG. The time cost for high-level 
ATPG is about two orders of magnitude less than that of the 
commercial ATPG. The gate-level SAF coverage, achieved 
by the proposed ATPG for the whole module under test, is 
better than that achieved by the commercial tool. 
The main goal of the experiments was to demonstrate the 
possibility of identification by high-level test generation the 
gate-level SAF redundancies. We demonstrated it on the 
basis of ALU test. The SAF coverage 99.92, achieved by 
100% high-level fault coverage test, means that 2 faults 
remained in ALU not detected, and are qualified, according 
to Corollary 1, as redundant. Since by fault simulation of the 
test for ALU (without its local control part) we found 100% 
SAF coverage, we can conclude that the 2 faults belong to the 
ALU control part. On the other hand, since low-level ATPG 
found 1 undetected fault in the ALU joint data/control circuit, 
we can conclude that this redundant fault belongs to the ALU 
local control part, and the second redundant fault belongs to 
the ALU global control part (see Fig.3). 
In the MULT block, fault coverage 99.09 refers to 835 not 
covered faults, which should be qualified according to 
Corollary 1 as redundant. By gate-level ATPG we found that 
from the 1256 not covered by ATPG faults, 865 were ATPG 
untestable, 105 were classified as redundant, and 286 
remained not detected. From the latter it follows, that the 444 
faults (the difference 1256 – 835), not covered by gate-level 
ATPG, however, were covered by the high-level ATPG. 
These faults should belong to the class of gate-level ATPG 
untestable faults.   
VIII. CONCLUSIONS 
In this paper, we propose a novel high-level fault model which 
was experimented for test generation for ALU control parts in 
processors. The model consists of a set of data constraints to 
be satisfied by data operands that is to be used in the test. The 
constraints are derived from instruction set, in which case, no 
implementation details are needed. The test is able to detect 
all non-redundant single and multiple SAF, and bridging 
faults in the control circuit under test. Hence, the proposed 
method is more powerful than the traditional ATPGs, which 
target only single SAF. A metric and a method for high-level 
fault simulation with a method for identification of high-level 
fault redundancies were developed. We demonstrated the 
feasibility of the proposed method to identifying low level 
redundant SAF by combining high-level ATPG and low level 
SAF simulation. The test program generated explicitly for 
testing only the control part achieves as well a very high fault 
coverage for data part. This is due to the power of constraints 
(1-2) to be used for selecting data operands. 
The future work will be to extend the proposed method 
for broader instruction sets of processors. Several 
optimization techniques are also possible.   
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